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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JACK H. BOWMAN and
EMMETT RIGNEY, dba
HUSTLER'S MARKET,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs

Case No.
10535

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
;;, Municipal Corporation,

Defendant and Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal involves the question of whether Salt Lake
City Ordinance, 20-5-1, et seq. is void and unenforceable.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was argued on stipulated facts to the Court
and a final judgment was entered granting a permanent
restraining order against enforcement of Salt Lake City
Ordinance 20-5-1, et seq. declaring said ordinance void
and unenforceable.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the lower court's final
judgment and judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Salt Lake City Ordinance, Title 20, Chapter 5, Sec.
1 through 16 provides as follows:
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AN ORDINANCE
~ ORDI.NANCE AMENDING Title 20 of the Re.
vis~d Ord~nances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1955, relatmg to licenses, by adding thereto a new Chapte 5
to be entitled, "Closing Sale."
r

Be it ordained by the Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City, Utah:
'
SECTION 1. That Title 20 of the Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1955, relating to licenses be
and the same hereby is, amended by adding the~et~
a new Chapter 5 to be entitled, "Closing Sale," to
read as follows:
"CHAPTER 5
"CLOSING SALE.
"Sec. 20-5-1. Definitions. As used in this chapter, the '
following terms shall have the meanings herein
stated:
"(1) SALE. "Sale" shall mean:
" (a) Any sale of, or any offer to sell to the public or
any group thereof, goods, wares or merchandise on
order, in transit or in stock, in connection with a declared purpose as set forth by advertising that such
sale is anticipatory to or for the purpose of terrnina·
tion, liquidation, revision, windup, anticipatory removal, dissolution or abandonment of the business or
that portion of the business conducted at any loca·
tion;and
"(b) All sales advertised in any manner calcula~
to convey to the public the belief that upon the dis·
posal of the goods to be placed on sale, the busines5
or that portion thereof being conducted at any loca·
tion will cease, be removed, interrupted, discon·
tinued or changed; and
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" ( c) All sales advertised to be 'Adjustor's Sale,' 'Assignee's Sale,' 'Administrator's Sale,' 'Closing Sale,'
·creditor's Sale,' 'End Sale,' 'Forced Out of Business
Sale,' 'Going Out of Business Sale,' 'Insurance Salvage Sale,' 'Last Days Sale,' 'Lease Expires Sale,'
'Liquidation Sale,' 'Removal Sale,' 'Reorganization
Sale,' 'Quitting Business Sale,' 'We Quit Sale,'
"Wholesale Closing Out Sale,' 'Fixtures for Sale,' or
advertised by any other expression or characterization or phrase of like or similar language which
would reasonably convey to the public that the sale
is being conducted as a result of such occurrences as
enumerated above, which are not intended to be all
inclusive but refer to type or class of sale.
" ( 2) PUBLISH, PUBLISHING, ADVERTISEMENT,ADVERTISING. 'Publish,' 'publishing,' 'advertisement,' 'advertising' shall mean any and all
means of conveying to the public notice of sale or
notice of intention to conduct a sale, whether by
word of mouth, newspaper advertisement, magazine
advertisement, handbill, written notice, printed
notice, printed display, billboard display, poster,
radio, or television announcement and any and all
means including oral, written or printed.
"Sec. 20-5-2. License required. It shall be unlawful
for any person to publish or conduct any sale as defined in this chapter without first obtaining a license
to do so. This license shall be in addition to any other
license which may be required by any other ordinances.
"Sec. 20-5-3. Fee. The fee for the license required by
the preceding section shall be Twenty-Five and
00/000 ($25.00) Dollars.
"Sec. 20-5-4. Application. Application for such license shall be in writing, executed by the applicant

4
under oath and shall contain the following inforrna.
tion:
" ( 1) Type of sale to be conducted and reason for con.
ducting such sale.
"(2) A description of the place where such sale is to
be held.
"(3) The nature of the occupancy, whether by lease
or sublease, and the date of termination of such occupancy.
" ( 4) The means to be employed in publishing such
sale, together with the text of any and all proposed
advertising matter.
" ( 5) An itemized list of the goods, wares and merchandise to be offered for sale, including those on
order and not received.
"(6) Where and from whom such stock was purchased or acquired; and, if not purchased, the man·
ner of such acquisition.
"(7) Any additional information that the license assessor and collector may require.
"Sec. 20-5-5. Year in business required prior to ~
suance of license. Exception. No person, company or
corporation shall be eligible for a license nor shall a
license be issued to any person, company or corporation unless they shall have been previously licensed
to do business at the same location of such closing
sale for the 365-day period immediately preceding
the beginning of the said sale except in those in;
stances where a bona fide hardship would be createa
and in such instances proof must be furnished to the
license assessor and collector that:
" ( 1) Such hardship exists; and

1

1
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"(2) At the conclusion of such closing sale all and
anv business transactions of that particular applicant
will completely and permanently cease and desist.
"Sec. 20-5-6. Issuance of license and term. Upon the
filing of an application and a finding by the license
assessor and collector after investigation that the
statements contained therein appear to be true and
are not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading in
any respect, a license shall be issued for a period not
exceeding thirty ( 30) days, upon the payment of the
fee herein prescribed.
"Sec. 20-5-7. Renewals. Term and fee. Upon satisfactory proof by the licensee that the stock itemized in
the original application has not been entirely disposed of, the license assessor and collector shall renew such license for a period of not exceeding thirty
(30) days. In no event shall a license be renewed
more than twice. For each renewal a fee of Ten and
00/00 ($10.00) Dollars shall be collected.
"Sec. 20-5-8. Display of license. Upon commencement
of any sale, and for the duration thereof, the license
therefor shall be conspiculously displayed near the
entrance to the premises.
"Sec. 20-5-9. Revocation of license. A license granted
pursuant to this chapter may be revoked by the license assessor and collector if:
"(1) The licensee has failed to include in the inventory required by the provisions of this chapter the
goods, wares and merchandise, or any part thereof,
required to be contained in such inventory.

" ( 2) The licensee has added, caused to be added or
permitted to be added, any goods, wares or merchandise not described in the original inventory.
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"(3) The licensee has violated any of the provisions
of this chapter or of the laws pertaining to advertising.
"Sec. 20-5-10. Rules and regulations. The license as- '
sessor and collector may make such rules and regula.
tions for the conduct and advertisement of the sales
defined in this chapter as may be necessary to carr.
out the purposes thereof. Such rules and regulatio~
must be submitted to and be approved by the board
of city commissioners.
"Sec. 20-5-11. Mingling of goods prohibited. No person contemplating conducting any sale as defined in
this chapter or during the continuance of such sale
shall order any goods, wares or merchandise for the
purpose of selling them at such sale; and any unusual
purchase or addition to the stock of such goods, ,
wares, or merchandise within sixty ( 60) days before
the filing of such application for a license to conduct
such sale shall be presumptive evidence that such
purchase or addition was made in contemplation of
such sale and for the purpose of selling it at such a
sale.
"Sec. 20-5-12. Each sale separate offense. Each saie
made without a license and each sale of goods, wares ·
or merchandise that is not inventoried and described
in the original application shall constitute a separate
offense under this chapter.
"Sec. 20-5-13. Resumption of business prohibited. ~o
person shall, upon the conclusion of any sale h~rem
defined, continue to conduct a business or busmess
operation of the same or similar nature to that for
the discontinuance of which such license was issued
at the same premises; nor shall such person within
one ( 1) year after conclusion of such sale resume '
such business at the same premises.
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"Sec. 20-5-14. Records to be kept. The licensee shall
keep suitable books and records and make them
available at all times to the city license assessor and
collector.
"Sec. 20-5-15. Exemptions to chapter. The following
persons shall be exempt from the scope and operation of this chapter:
" ( 1) Persons acting pursuant to an order or process
of a court of competent jurisdiction.
''(2) Persons acting in accordance with their powers
and duties as public officers such as sheriffs and marshals.
"Sec. 20-5-16. Compliance with chapter required. It
shall be unlawful for any person to violate or fail
to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter
or any rule or regulation adopted pursuant thereto."
SECTION 2. In the opinion of the Board of Commissioners, it is necessary for the peace, health and safety of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City, Utah, that
this ordinance become effective immediately.
SECTION 3. This ordinance shall take effect upon its
first publication.
Passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City, Utah, this 5th day of March, 1964.

J. BRACKEN LEE,
Mayor.
HERMAN J. HOGENSEN,
City Recorder.
Bill No. 16 of 1964.
Published March 12, 1964.

(C-32)
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Respondent Emmett Rigney commenced the business
of Hustler's Market at 958 North Eighth West Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah, about March, 1964, and from that date
to approximately October, 1965, suffered a continuous fi.
nancial loss. Respondent Rigney determined to cease
doing business and in November, 1965, contacted Respondent Jack H. Bowman to purchase Rigney's grocery
stock and conduct a "closing out sale" with the understanding that Respondent Bowman was to purchase additional merchandise inventory for purposes of selling at
final sale. On about November 28, 1965, Respondents
were contacted by the City Licensing Department and
were informed of the provisions of Salt Lake City Ordinance heretofore set out.
Respondents being aware that their intentions were
not in conformance with the ordinance determined it to
be a useless act to apply for the license and decided to
obtain a declaratory judgment of validity or invalidity of
such ordinance.

1

Plaintiffs have advertised the "quitting business sale"
at the said Hustler's Market and Appellant by stipulation, 1
does not contend that there was anything false or fraud·
ulent in the advertising as such advertisement may per·
tain to the prices and the commodities listed therein. '
However, the Appellant does suggest that the full page ad 1
with the caption across the top of the advertisement,
"HUSTLER'S MARKET QUITS - GIGANTIC CLOSE
OUT SALE - YOUR GAIN - SAVE - SAVE - SAVE,"
even with the information at the very bottom of the ad
in small print that, "Stock will be supplemented to meet 1
demand", is calculated to mislead the public. On Page 9
1
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is a representative and typical advertisement Respondents continually used, said fact having been stipulated to.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ARE EMPOWEREDTO
ENACT ORDINANCES PROVIDING FOR, AMONG
OTHER THINGS, THE REASONABLE, PROPER AND
NECESSARY REGULATIONS OF A PARTICULAB
CALLING OR BUSINESS AND THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PUBLIC.

1

It is submitted that such power is expressly conferred
by statute. Title 10, Chapter 8, Section 39, 1953 Utah Code
Annotated shows the following authority for municipal

power:

" ... they may license, tax and regulate the business
conducted by merchants, wholesalers and retailers,
shopkeepers and storekeepers . . . "
The above section was held to confer power on the city
municipality to "regulate" a particular calling or bus·
iness. The test given for the validity of such "regulation"
is that it is such:
" ... reasonable regulation as may be deemed neces·
sary and wholesome in conducting the business in a
proper and orderly manner ... " Salt Lake City vs.
Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 Pacific 2nd 537.
Title 10, Chapter 8, Section 84, 1953 Utah Code An·
notated gives municipalities the following additional
powers:

1

1
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"They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make
all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for
carrying into effect or discharging all powers and
duties conferred by this chapter, and such as are
necessary and proper to provide for the safety and
preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof ... "
The above cited section is known and referred to as the
·General Welfare Clause". Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 8 Pacific 2nd 591.
It can't be argued that the city may not pass ordinances

designed to protect the public welfare and promote the
public prosperity or that the city can not regulate the
affairs of business by city ordinance; it can only be
argued that a particular ordinance or regulation is unreasonable and improper, thereby becoming an unreasonable extension of the proper exercise of police power.
POINT II
THE CITY ORDINANCE, 20-5-1 DESIGNATED,
"CLOSING SALE", COVERING, " ... MERCHANTS,
WHOLESALERS AND RETAILERS, SHOPKEEPERS
AND STOREKEEPERS ... " IS A REASONABLE AND
PROPER "REGULATION" TO PROMOTE "PUBLIC
PROSPERITY", AND TO PROTECT "PUBLIC WELFARE" AND HENCE WITHIN THE STATUTORY
PEROGATIVE OF THE POLICE POWERS EXTENDED
TO SALT LAKE CITY.
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(a) The "Closing Sale" ordinance is authorized by ex.
pressly delegated power given to the municipalitv
to "license, tax and regulate", business and is not
therefore, ultra vires.
The ordinance in question is not ultra vires. In the case
of Ritholz vs. City of Salt Lake, cited as 3 Utah 2nd 38~
284 Pacific 2nd 704, this court held that a city ordinanc;
prohibiting price advertising of prescription eyeglasses
was invalid. The Ritholz case was held to be controllinob
by the lower court in this present appeal. In regard to the
issues as to whether the ordinance was ultra vires in the
Ritholz case, the court said it was void for unreasonableness but that the city had authority to regulate a "particular calling or business" and never did specifically hold
that the ordinance was ultra vires:
" . . . The court has generally adhered to a policy of
rather strictly limiting the extension of the powers
of a city by implication. Plaintiff urges that because
of this commitment we should hold the ordinance
invalid since there is no express authority delegated
to the city relative to advertising eyeglasses. It~
pointed out, however, that the powers relied on by
the city in enacting this ordinance are the expressly
delegated powers to 'license, tax and regulate ... the
business conducted by merchants, wholesales and re·
tailers, shopkeepers and storekeepers . .. ' (emphasis
added), to preserve the safety, health and morals.of
the city and to safeguard the general health of them·
habitants. We stated in Ogden City vs. Leo that,
'where the power to regulate a particular calling.or
business is conferred on a city, it authorizes such c1fy
to prescribe and enforce all such proper and reason·
able rules and regulations as may be deemed neces·
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sary and wholesome in conducting the business in a
proper and orderly manner.'
In this particular context the power to regulate business can mean only such regulations as are reasonable and substantially related to the safeguarding of
the public health which raises the question whether
the advertising prescribed by the ordinance bears
such a relation."
It should be noted that in the above cited holding, the
Court was there faced with the health provision of the
statute while in the instant case we are dealing with the
general welfare and prosperity clause portion of the
statute and the same principle must be applied to both
portions of the statute. Therefore, it must be conceded
that the ordinance is not ultra vires per se; the ordinance
must be found to be an unreasonable and improper regulation of business to fail.
The city, in enacting the present ordinance relies on
the expressly delegated powers to "license, tax and regulate . . . the business conducted by merchants, wholesalers and retailers, shopkeepers and storekeepers ... ",
''as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety
and preserve the health and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for
the protection of property therein ... ". For the ordinance
in question to be ultra vires, it must be found that the city
did not have the express or implied power to "license, tax
or regulate" the "particular calling or business" covered
by the ordinance in question. The issue as to whether the
instant ordinance is such "reasonable and proper regulation" as may be "deemed necessary and wholesome in
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conducting the business in a proper and orderly manner"
is a valid question running to whether the ordinance 18
arbitrary or unreasonable regulation of an expressly
delegated authority and is not an ultra vires issue strictl\'
speaking in the modern use of the term as defined b~
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1951, page 1692.:
"Ultra Vires. While the phrase 'ultra vires' has been
used to designate, not only acts beyond the express
and implied powers of a corporation, but also acts.
contrary to public policy or contrary to some express
statute prohibiting them, the latter class of acts io
now termed illegal and the 'ultra vires' confined tc,
the former class."
(b) The courts are bound by a strong presumption of
validity of a municipal ordinance.
In the case of Ogden City vs. Leo, 55 Utah 556, 182 Pa·
cific 532, it was held that a city ordinance regulating restaurants or public eating places was valid and this court
there cited the general rule as related to presumption of
validity of a municipal ordinance:

"It is generally presumed that conditions exist which
make ordinances necessary or proper for the welfare of the community."
See also McCune vs. City of Phoenix, 317 Pacific 2nci
537, 83 Arizona 98; 62 CJS Municipal Corporation Section
208; McClain vs. City of South Pasadena, 318 Pacific 2nd
199, 155 Ca. 2nd 423; City of Portland vs. Stevens, m
Pacific 2nd 173, 180 Oregon 514.

It has been argued in some of the cases, Salt Lake City
vs. Revene, 124 Pacific 2nd 537, 101 Utah 504, and Rithoh
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vs. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2nd 385, 284 Pacific 2nd 702;

that the ordinances should be strictly construed as to the
untra vires question. A close reading of the just cited
cases and the Leo vs. Ogden City case cited supra and the
cases citing the general rule that a "presumption of validity" of an ordinance, clearly indicate that the general
rule of strictly construing ordinances and statutes passed
!1 v cities operating under delegated powers is a rule applicable only under such conditions where there is no express or implied delegated power to "license, tax and regulate" a "certain calling or business". For example if a
statute expressly authorized a city to license merchants,
but said nothing about regulating them, the ordinance
regulating merchants through the licensing power would
be .strictly construed, but an ordinance allowing a license
fee would carry with it a presumption of validity unless
it was clearly shown that the license fee was unreasonable.
Thus in the instant case the closing business ordinance
of Salt Lake City is authorized under the expressly delegated power to "regulate" a "particular calling or business" and said ordinance must be presumed to be necessary for the welfare of the community unless and until
it is clearly shown to be an unreasonable regulation or
in violation of constitutional rights.
This court in the Salt Lake City vs. Revene case cited
supra is authority for the above. There is some confusion
created by dictum in the opinion and in this case, the
court held that:
" ... an ordinance fixing hours of a barber shop business was not a reasonable regulation of said business

~ f

I

;:mdLPncein\alidintkit \l;, ,,1,i,,,1,, , (. r rt,,
sonaL!e reiationsh1p to the protcct10n ' t the pui1iir
I

The court distinguished between hours of regulation ut
a butcher shop as being reasonable and the regulation (Ji
hours of a barber shop as being unreasonable. ThP coui:
was undoubtedly correct m such a distmctwn. llnfortunatelv,
. hnwcq r. the\·
. added the followinu
~

" ... \Vhile we think tl:r_ question not treF fmi.
doubt. we elect to follo\\' tfw ]inf' of case~ ::ib( '.e '"'
nut e.~/;L'ciall,- m \ iew nf 11" pn1H 1ple n .. 1t <d'\ LL
reasonable '>Ubst~mtial doubt conu.'rnmt; the 1·ri,.
ence of the powtJr (emphasis added l is re~oll·ed bi
the courts against the corporat10n (city 1 and thf
power denied. 1 Dillon. Municipal Corporation. 5tr
edition, page 449, Section 237."

It is obvious that this rule is a correct rule. but rs 1~1
applicable m the barbershop casl' as well as in the instant
case. The f'Xistence of the power tu regubt( \\·a-; 11r·t ~Pinc
questioned. only the reasonableness. In tlw bt1tdie ~hop
case, the court thought it \\'cb reasonable regutati(ln. ht'
unreasonable in the barber shop ca.-,e.
Where there is an~· 'fair, reasonable. substantial doub 1
concernini-; the exi:>tencc of the power itself the pre.;ump·
tion is that there is no power but where tlw pO\\·er ht\·
pressly delegated such as the power to "regulate" a "par
ticular calling or business ... there is a presumption that
the ordinar. :e 1s valid and may Lr' .iecl&rcr! im·alhl .,,J
b} a clear .-.;Lowmg that it is ,n: llnreCJsonJl:le rPgul~ 11 • 1
and 01 unconstitut1011c1l.
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It also has been argued that although there is an ex-

'Jressly delegated authority to "regulate" a "particular
calling or business" there is no express authority for a
closing business sale ordinance and hence no presumption. Therefore the ordinance should be strictly construed. In the Salt Lake City vs. Bennion Gas & Oil Company, 80 Utah 53, 15 Pacific 2nd 648; a city ordinance was
attacked which provided for the charging of fees for inspection of oil and gas business. The court there held:
''It is not necessary that the statute should specifical-

ly give to the municipality power to charge and
collect a fee to cover the cost of inspection and regulation. Where the authority is lodged in the municipality to inspect and regulate, the further authority
to charge a reasonable fee to cover the cost of the inspection and regulation will be implied."
The following authorities are also cited as holding that
the courts were bound by a strong presumption of validity of a municipal ordinance. Hopkins vs. Galland Mercantile Laundry Company, 21Pacific2nd 553, (California
1933); Sunny Slope Water Company vs. City of Pasadena, 33 Pacific 2nd 672 (California 1934); Skalko vs.
City of Sunnyvale, 91 Pacific 2nd 166, 93 Pacific 2nd 93
(California 1939); City of Spokane vs. Coon, 100 Pacific
2nd 36, (Washington 1940).
Also in State vs. Atchison reported in 92 Kansas 431,
140 Pacific 873, Ann. Cas. 1916 bat page 504 states:
"It is generally presumed that conditions exist which
make ordinances necessary and proper for the welfare of the community."
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The same thought is expressed in another form in
Seattle vs. Hurst, 15 Washington 424, 97 Pacific 454; 18
LRA NS) 169, where the following language is adopted
from Herr and Bennis Municipal Police Ordinance Section 127:
"An ordinance to be void for unreasonableness must
be plainly and clearly unreasonable. There must be
evidence of weight."
(c) That Salt Lake City ordinance Title 20 Chapter 5
covering licensing of "Closing Out Sale" serves a
definite purpose in protecting the consumer public
and business community and therefore promotes
the public welfare.
Salt Lake City's ordinance regulating "Closing Out
Sales" is very narrow in its application. To the bona-fide
business man who is desirous of legitimately closing up
shop, the ordinance causes no burden. The very nature
of the ordinance is to protect the public and the business
community from individuals who would defraud the
consumer. The ordinance in no way regulates the method
or manner of sale, it merely fixes a reasonable time in
which to complete the sale, designates the goods which
may be sold as the goods on hand or ordered in the mer·
chant's inventory and the sale advertising material and
method. The ordinance in no way controls operation of
the business or of a sale by a business which is not being
discontinued.
For many years past, it has been an obviously recog·
nized fact that a "Closing Out Sale" is a consumer's op·
portunity to purchase merchandise at a bargain; that the
merchant has decided to liquidate his inventory in the

quickest and most efficient way by reducing prices to his
cost or even below so that all merchandise, even that
which is slow to move, will be sold without continuing in
ousiness and incurring high overhead with a diminishing
return due to a limited inventory.
In the past the community has witnessed an imposition
upon the consuming public and businessmen by the individual or company who is in the "going out of business",
business. It is expected that, when a merchant "quits"
business or vacates a selling location, the merchandise to
be sold is of like quality to that which was sold in establishing the general reputation of the business. Unprincipled individuals have therefore taken advantage of the
public by purchasing inferior merchandise both before
and during the sale and then selling it without disclosing
the inferior quality. There have been many occasions
where the inferior merchandise at closing out sales has
been sold at the normal retail selling price maintained by
competing merchants. The public is further prejudiced by
the implied and generally stated fact that all sales are
final and the consumer therefore has no recourse when
the inferior merchandise proves non-servicable. It has
been the experience of the community that many businesses have been established for a short duration and
then have gone through a "going out of business sale"
sometimes lasting a year or more. Upon reflection one can
only conclude that the establishment of the business was
for the sole purpose of "going out of business" thus luring
the public to their premises by misrepresentation, while
during such sales the display cases and shelves continue
well stocked with the almost daily arrival of new merchandise purchased to assist in "going out of business".
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Although it would appear that the only damage is to
the unsuspecting consumer the greater damage in the
long run is to the business community. Should such
fraudulent practices be allowed to continue unchecked
the consuming public will ultimately become well ad.
vised of the disadvantages of such sales and avoid them.
But what about the business community? Businesses
generally close down and quit because of two prime reasons. First, the business is not economical in operation
and generally the liabilities exceed the assets. Thus such
"closing out sales" are to satisfy creditors. Secondly, the
operator simply desires to quit and recoup his investment
which he may use for retirement or new ventures. In
either case, should the consuming public become disillusioned with "closing out sales" the proceeds from sucn
legitimate sales will be impaired. In the first instance
the creditors may be irreparably damaged in an already
unpleasant condition. In the second case a merchant may
be severely harmed in that his return of capital will be at
a considerable loss compared to the initial investment.
A further detriment to the business community in gen·
eral and competing businesses in particular is the divert·
ing of consumers from reputable and established firms
because of the unfair competition practiced by the "going
out of business" business.
The ordinance will promote public confidence in the
advertising of such sales, in that it will tend to bring
about an acceptance of such advertisements as being ,
genuine.
The purpose therefore of the ordinance is simply to as:
sure the public that the business is indeed "closing out.
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An honest business man should have no complaints and
will not be unduly regulated by the ordinance. It must
be concluded from the above that this ordinance is a reasonable and proper regulation of "quitting business
sales" and is substantially related to the safe guarding of
the public welfare. It also must be pointed out that the
ordinance is not a prohibitive ordinance such as in the
Ritholz Case but is a regulatory one affecting only those
merchants who are making a business of "going out of
business sales", to the detriment of the public.
POINT III

THE SALT LAKE CITY "CLOSING SALES" ORDINANCE CONSTITUTES A VALID EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER AND DOES NOT DEPRIVE RESPONDENTS OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Consistent with the instant ordinance is the following
general rule as cited in 37 Am. Jur. Sec. 305:
"Municipal corporations under authorized grants of
police power emanating directly from constitutional
provisions or from grants from the state legislature
by way of ... specific state statutes may regulate any
trade, occupation, calling or business, the unrestrained pursuit of which might affect injuriously,
the public health, morals, safety, comfort or welfare,
or might result in fraud or imposition on the public.
The courts have stated that regulatory powers of
such nature are so well recognized and established
as to be beyond question."
The court below in the instant case held that the going
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out of business ordinance
.
. was void basing its ru11·ngs on
the law espoused m R1tholz vs. City of Salt Lake , Cle,
·t,
supra. There this court held that:
"We are of the opinion that it (ordinance) does no•

~av~ any .substanti.al bearing on public health as t;
JUst1fy this extens10n of the police power into the

regulation of private business and the violation 1:
the right to freely advertise in and sell one's pro~:
erty."

It must be pointed out that in the Ritholz case the "Or
dinance forbids all advertising of prices of prescription
eyewear''.

The Ritholz case therefore can be clearly distinguisheG
from the case at bar in that the ordinance in the Ritholz
case has an arbitrary prohibition of advertising of prices
for prescription eyewear; whereas in the instant case we
have a regulatory ordinance controlling "quitting bill·
iness sales". The standard or test which is applied to the
question of constitutionality of an ordinance is much
more stringent when that ordinance is a prohibitory ordi·
nance than when it is merely regulatory. See 11 Am. Jur.
Section 281.
In the case of Eskind vs. City of Vero Beach, 159 South
2nd 209, the Florida Supreme Court held that a city ordi·
nance restricting the use of outdoor advertising for rates
of motels was unconstitutional and gave as one of the
tests in determining the reasonableness of the ordinance
the consideration of the: "Effect of such legislation on the
rights of citizens from the aspect of its practical irnpacr
The practical effect of the ordinance in the Ritholz case
is a literal prohibition of admittedly legitimate advertis·
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ing whereas in the present case we have a reasonable
regulation of going out of business sale advertising.
A New York City ordinance similar to the ordinance in
question here was upheld in the face of an attack on its
constitutionality. Windsor Madison Corporation vs.
O'Connell, 172 New York Supplement 2nd 198, 9 misc.
2nd 1087, by the New York Supreme Court and also
People vs. Windsor Madison, 173 New York Supplement
2nd 964. In the first of the two cases cited the New York
C1Ly License Commissioner denied a license to conduct
"going out of business" sale to a haberdasher who did not
wait for issuance of license before displaying signs appropriate to such sale. In determining the constitutionality of the "going out of business" ordinance, the New
York Supreme Court stated:
"It is said that the provisions of the administrative
code ... contravene the constitution in that they deprive the plaintiff of property without due process
and interfere with its right of speech. The plaintiff
is not deprived of any property, nor is any property
right interfered with. It is not being restricted in sale
of its goods nor is it being limited in respect to prices
it may charge. The only restriction is on calling its
sales a closing out sale or giving it some similar designation.

No property right is involved. Nor is free speech, except in a fanciful sense, concerned in the problem.
It is well recognized that the police power extends
to the regulation of advertising that may mislead the
public. The conditions which gave rise to the code
article are well known. The public was being induced
by unscrupulous merchants to make purchases under
the belief that stocks of goods were being sold at
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sacrifice prices. A favored device was by distress .
vertising displayed on the store that the proprie~d0
was going out of business for one cause or anothe
To prevent fraud by limiting such sales to instancei
where the representations were bona fide is not an
interference with free speech." (Emphasis added)

!

In the case of People vs. Windsor Madison, 173 New
York Supplement 2nd 964, a case arising out of the same
ordinance and the same occasion as the above cited case
the New York Magistrate speaking in that case states as
follows:
"The statute does not interfere with defendantc ,
right to sell its goods, nor does it impair its freedom
to determine the price at which it will sell them The
restrictions imposed by the statute are no more dras·
tic than is reasonable to accomplish the end for which
the law was adopted.
The court goes on to say:

"It follows therefore the enforcement of the statute
here in question constitutes a valid exercise of a valid
police power and does not deprive defendant of
property without due process of law."
Also applicable to the issue here is the general rule of
law as stated in 11 Am. Jur. Sec. 281 in regard to the con·
stitutionality of regulation of auction sales:
"The state may forbid auction sales at certain times
such as at night, and in certain places, particularly
with reference to such types of merchandise as jewel·
ry, and may in other instances hedge about such
transactions with regulations conducive to the pre·
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vention of imposition. In any event such fraud preventing regulation must be reasonable, and if regulation alone will afford the requisite protection, absolute prohibition is unconstitutional." (See also 53
ALR 2nd 1433 and 39 ALR 760, 766)
CONCLUSION
The power relied on by Salt Lake City in enacting the
"closing sale" ordinance is the expressly delegated power
to. 'license, tax and regulate ... the business conducted
by merchants ... to provide for the peace and good order,
comfort and convenience", of the public.
Under this delegated authority there is no question
that the ordinance is not ultra vires but is clearly within
the police powers extended to Salt Lake City by statute.
There is no question that this regulatory ordinance is
an expressly delegated power and unless found to be an
unreasonable and improper regulation of an expressly
delegated authority cannot fail by reason of being ultra
vires.
As to the issue of reasonableness of the regulation in
the case of an expressly delegated authority as we have
here the court is bound by strong presumption of validity
and as quoted supra from the Ogden City vs. Leo:
"It is generally presumed that the conditions exist
which make ordinances necessary or proper for the
welfare of the community".
The imposition on the public of those who make a business of "going out of business" is a "substantial" evil
which the present ordinance reasonably regulates and
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must be presumed to be necessary for the welfare of the
community. Although in the instant case Respondents in
their advertisement pertaining to prices and commodities ·
practiced no fraud or falsehood and were actually closing
business within a 90 day period the advertisement was
directed at taking advantage of the drawing power to the
public of a "going out of business" sale when in fact the
sole purpose was other than a completely bona fide "Quit- 1
ting business" sale.
The New York Supreme Court held a similar New
York City Ordinance constitutional as a reasonable extension of the police power noting that the ordinance
only forbids the merchant calling his sale a "closing sale
unless he conforms to the ordinance.
In taking into consideration the balance between the
imposition on the public and the limitation on constitu·
tional rights by not allowing Respondents to call their
sale a "closing sale" or some other similar designation 1
without compliance with the instant ordinance, is clearly
weighted in favor of the welfare and prosperity of the
community at large and therefore should be held to be a
constitutional and valid exercise of the police power by
Salt Lake City.
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